University of Louisville

ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's Institutional Repository
College of Arts & Sciences Senior Honors
Theses

College of Arts & Sciences

5-2013

Identity crisis : the development of ethnic identities in South
Africa and Northern Ireland and resolutions to ethnic violence.
Erran Michael Huber
University of Louisville

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.library.louisville.edu/honors
Part of the Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation
Huber, Erran Michael, "Identity crisis : the development of ethnic identities in South Africa and Northern
Ireland and resolutions to ethnic violence." (2013). College of Arts & Sciences Senior Honors Theses.
Paper 50.
http://doi.org/10.18297/honors/50

This Senior Honors Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Arts & Sciences at ThinkIR:
The University of Louisville's Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in College of Arts & Sciences
Senior Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's Institutional
Repository. This title appears here courtesy of the author, who has retained all other copyrights. For more information,
please contact thinkir@louisville.edu.

Identity Crisis

Identity Crisis: The Development of Ethnic Identities in South Africa and Northern Ireland
and Resolutions to Ethnic Violence

By
Erran Michael Huber

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
For Graduation (summa or magna) cum laude
And
For Graduation with Honors from the Department of Political Science (if pertinent)
University of Louisville
May, 2013

1

Identity Crisis

2

Ethnic conflicts in South Africa and Northern Ireland have long been characterizing
features of those regions. During the Troubles and Apartheid, the ethnic tensions that had
lingered for so long exploded into widespread violence in Northern Ireland, England and South
Africa. The purpose of this paper is to characterize the presence of residual ethnic conflict in
post-colonial states.1 In particular, this paper seeks to answer the question surrounding the
reduction of ethnic violence in recent years, particularly following the signing of the Good
Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland and the end of Apartheid in South Africa: why have levels
of ethnic violence reduced over time in these states? Given that the issue of identity is the
underlying factor in ethnic violence in both states, how can we account for an overall decline in
violence when identities are still present?
There are similarities between the emergence of ethnic conflict in South Africa and
Northern Ireland, in terms of social, political, and economic factors, and in the fact that these two
states have both experienced a decline in overall ethnic violence. In particular, I assert that the
development of ethnic identity, the concentration of power, social status, and economic tools
primarily in the hands of one ethnic group, and the subsequent denial of progress for other ethnic
groups sparked ethnic conflict in both states. However, the reasons behind a decline in ethnic
violence are different in South Africa and Northern Ireland, despite the strong emphasis on
identity that has served as an underlying cause of both conflicts. In South Africa, there is a
remaking of identity, in particular among ethnically white South Africans, out of necessity of
finding a new role in a multi-ethnic political system. In Northern Ireland, however, violence has

1

“"With these caveats in mind, we define ethnic violence on first approximation as violence perpetrated across
ethnic lines, in which at least one party is not a state (or a representative of a state), and in which the putative ethnic
difference is coded--by perpetrators, targets, influential third parties, or analysts--as having been integral rather than
incidental to the violence, that is, in which the violence is coded as having been meaningfully oriented in some way
to the different ethnicity of the target." Roger Brubaker and David Laitin, “Ethnic and Nationalist Violence.” Annual
Review of Sociology 4 (1998): 423-452.
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been reduced not out of a redefinition of identity, but through a stalemate between ethnic groups
created out of fear that a continuation of violence would evolve into an even bloodier conflict.
Thus, while these states have established a tentative peace out from situations with similar causal
factors and levels of violence, the means that they have used to accomplish these circumstances
presents notable differences and ultimately, two various solutions to the issue of ethnic violence.
With this in mind, this paper seeks to not only characterize the present state of affairs in Northern
Ireland and South Africa, but also explore the factors behind what it will really take to truly put
an end to the conflict. To do so, I first demonstrate that the issue of identity conflict was central
to the development of ethnic tension in South Africa and Northern Ireland. Next, I outline the
methods these states have used to reduce ethnic violence, which has occurred in spite of the
continued presence of identity. Finally, I offer a variety of techniques to further maintain and
preserve the relative peace that currently exists among ethnic groups.
I. Introduction: Identity Development and Ethnic Violence in South Africa and Northern Ireland
In his analysis of the origins of ethnic conflict, Michael Brown outlines the circumstances
he believes are necessary for the development of internal conflict. He asserts that there are four
factors that predispose a country to conflict: structural factors; political factors; economic/social
factors; and cultural perceptual factors.2

2

Michael Brown, “The Causes of Internal Conflict,” in M. Brown (Ed.), Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict.
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. 1997) pp. 3-25
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Source: Michael Brown, “The Causes of Internal Conflict,” p. 5

He also asserts that internal conflicts are triggered through four ways: internal, mass-level factors
like bad domestic problems; external mass-level factors like bad neighborhoods; external, elitelevel factors like bad neighbors; and by internal, elite-level factors (bad leaders).3 However, the
situations in Northern Ireland and South Africa call this model into question. Those
circumstances demonstrate that it was the development of ethnic identity that was the underlying
cause of ethnic tension and the adoption of a strong sense of superiority by the ruling class that
guided and influenced the development of political, social, and economic institutions. While
Brown asserts the four main clusters of factors are contributory to creating conflict, the problem
with this argument is that cultural factors proceeds the implementation of discriminatory
structural, political, economic institutions. Thus, I argue that these political, structural, and
economic factors stem as a result of identity and culture, rather than cause culture-identity
clashes. Rather than causes unto themselves, these factors become the tools that ethnic groups
use against other enclaves to maintain the prosperity of the in-group. The inability of these
groups to cooperate and the desire by these groups to retain or attain social, political, and
economic dominance in an exclusive fashion is what causes ethnic conflict in these cases. Colin
Knox and Rachel Monaghan support this assertion and wrote,
3

Ibid.

Identity Crisis

5

The theoretical basis for comparison...is that both countries exhibit fundamental
differences

over

national

identity

or

‘ethno-national’

dimensions....Once

the

consciousness of being a part of an ethnic group is created then distinct languages,
religious beliefs, and political institutions become part of that ethnicity. The fundamental
conflict in Northern Ireland and South Africa is...between ethnic groups over national
identity.4
The subsequent exclusion of those deemed “Other” from social, political, and economic
advancement through equal participation in these enterprises was the true trigger of ethnic
conflict. Ethnocentrism and cultural jingoism pervaded the development of these identities, and
political, social, and economic institutions were fashioned as a result of elites perpetuating these
cultural myths. Thus, these factors were the result of trying to control ethnic groups, rather than
the true root causes. As such, a more refined model is necessary to explain the history of ethnic
conflict in South Africa and Northern Ireland, one that accounts for identity development and
how this led to tensions among groups. In seeking to define a place in society, groups created
unique identities around common ethnic characteristics, and barring the potential for
advancement, members of these ethnic enclaves engaged in cultural myth-making, antagonism,
and later the use of violence in an attempt to force a change in the status-quo more conducive to
their ethnic group.5
In terms of structural factors, Brown identifies weak states as part of the composite
features, and the issue of economic development and modernization compared to surrounding
states as a part of economic factors. But it is difficult to see how these features contribute to the
4

Colin Knox and Rachel Monaghan, Informal Justice in Divided Societies, (New York: Palgrave Macmillian. 2002).
p.4
5
Jack Snyder and Karen Ballantine, “Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas” in Nationalism and Ethnic
Conflict, ed. Michael Brown, et al. (Cambridge: The MIT Press. 2001). pp. 62-64
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development of ethnic conflict in South Africa and Northern Ireland. In both cases, the United
Kingdom established sound state institutions and a high rate of economic development as a result
of its colonial presence in South Africa and Northern Ireland.6 In regards to the other underlying
causes of internal conflict, an analysis of the circumstances in South Africa and Northern Ireland
will demonstrate how these were not the original causes of ethnic conflict, but the result of
identity development that asserted ethnic superiority.
A. The Creation of British National Identity
British national identity prior to the Troubles and Apartheid was rooted in a sense of
cultural, political, and economic superiority and stimulated the development of symbolism,
cultural myth-making and tension between all ethnic groups. An inherent view of superiority was
embedded in British cultural self-evaluation, one that developed over time and found its apex
during the 19th century, at the height of empire. As Robin Winks wrote,
If any one generalization may stand, however, it is that British imperialism was based
upon a sense of superiority, upon a conviction of a superior economic system, a superior
political code, on access to a superior view of some Higher Being, on a superior way of
life. Idealists and realists alike sought to spread what they felt in their hearts was
superior, to spread their institutions because they were superior and therefore not only
easy to spread but a positive good for those to whom they were applied—or a positive
way to preserve the power and prestige of England, itself worth preserving at all costs
because superior.7
We see this sense of superiority permeate social, political, and economic institutions in a
number of ways. New intellectual developments emerged that helped justify a sense of
7

Robin Winks. British Imperialism: Gold, God, Glory. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 1963). pp 2-3.
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superiority and rationalize the actions conducted under imperial rule, giving stronger credence to
previously-held beliefs of primacy. Darwin’s theory of natural selection, supplemented by the
writings of Herbert Spencer, Thomas Malthus, and Francis Galton, would soon be applied to the
human condition, and writers would posit that races that were more “civilized” were so as a
result of favorable evolutionary conditions—superiority as a natural and inherent quality. Such
sentiments of Social Darwinism can be seen in the words of Joseph Chamberlain in his speech at
the Imperial Institute in London in 1895. He states:
I was perhaps doubly worthy of this welcome, both for my faith in the Empire, and my
faith in the English race. Yes, I believe in this race, the greatest governing race the world
has ever seen, in this Anglo-Saxon race, so proud, tenacious, self-confident and
determined, this race which neither climate nor change can degenerate, which will
infallibly be the predominate force of future history and universal civilization…And I
believe in the future of this world-wide Empire, of which no Englishman can speak
without a feeling of enthusiasm.8
But Social Darwinism was not the only paradigm to emerge during this period that would change
British social conceptions. Rudyard Kipling, the “…appointed songster, the poet laureate of
Empire…”9 would capture national consciousness and help cement pro-imperialist mentalities in
the masses. He not only advanced the growth of national empire, but also wrote of Britain’s
social place in the world, arguing that it was the “White Man’s Burden” to bring the social,
political, and economic glories of the British to the lesser races, “half-devil and half-child.”
Kipling tasked the British to bear a paternalistic responsibility toward the other peoples of the
world, though they would resist and be unappreciative of the “gift.” This mentality, while
8
9

Victor Bérard. British Imperialism and Commercial Supremacy. (New York: H. Fertig. 1973). pp. 47-48.
Ibid., p. 46
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probably intended to be “humanistic,” nonetheless derived and reinforced the assumption of
British social superiority.
Complementing the notions of British social superiority was the assertion that British rule
was the best form of government for the people in its dependencies; thus the notion of superiority
of political institutions becomes a part of British ethnic identity. Writing in 1858 in particular on
India, but with reference to its other holdings, John Stuart Mill asserted:
There are two political functions devolving on the British nation. It has to provide for its
own government; and for the government of the much more extensive and populous
countries which are dependent on it. The majority however of its dependencies it has,
wisely and necessarily, divested itself of the duty of governing; having found, after long
trial, that it was unable to govern them satisfactorily. The only great outlying possession
of the British Crown which is not now left substantially to its own government, is India.
The question is, in what manner Great Britain can best provide for the government, not of
three or four millions of English colonists, but of 150 millions of Asiatics, who cannot be
trusted to govern themselves.10
This example helps demonstrate not only the view that political dominance by the British ethnic
group is the superior policy, but also simultaneously asserts the inferiority of other ethnic groups
in self-management.
Further fueling the notions of ethnic superiority were the successes of Britain
economically when compared to the rest of the world. The successes of the industrial revolution
in Britain not only reinforced the notion of the British as the superior group, but created
10

John Stewart Mill, “A President in Council the Best Government for India” in The Collected Works of John
Stuart Mill, XXX - Writings on India, ed. John M. Robson, Martin Moir, and Zawahir Moir (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1990).
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circumstances that they believed necessitated the concentration of economic goods and services
under their hand for continued success. The table below shows Britain’s economic progress
compared to its rivals:

Source: Angus Maddison. The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective (Paris: OECD, 2006). p. 264.

This success in economic pursuits only served to enhance the notions of the British as a
superior people when compared to their contemporaries.
The stress, therefore, must be placed on the sense of identity that leads to these other
political, economic, and social factors, in particular the strong sense of superiority in the identity
of the ruling class of Britons, which influenced the development of other ethnic ideologies.
B. The Development of Identities and South African Ethnic Conflict
i. British Ethnocentrism and South African Development
Complementing the notion of inherent superiority in the British identity was the idea that
those outside the realm of Britishness had to conform to British norms or be excluded from
opportunity. In South Africa, the British leveraged notions of superiority as justification to

Identity Crisis

10

exclude other ethnic groups.11 A series of discriminatory political institutions began under the
British, established to exclude non-Britons from enjoying economic or social equality as
economic progress continued to rise. The adoption of British social and religious customs and
the recognition that one’s economic place was below that of the English were the hallmarks of a
“civilized” Other. Failure to do so resulted in exclusion, and the development of tensions.12 As a
result, the political affairs of South Africa became incorporated into to the common theme of
superiority of Britishness and identity; it was from this belief that we see the institutionalization
of discriminatory politics. William Worger and Rita Burns outline clearly the exclusionary
practices that were a consequence of the expansion of British territory. They wrote:
In the new industrial cities, African workers were subjected to a bewildering array of
discriminatory laws and practices, all enforced in order to keep workers cheap and
pliable…In short, many of the discriminatory features so typical of twentieth-century
South Africa—pass laws, urban ghettos, impoverished rural homelands, African migrant
labour—were first established in the course of South Africa’s industrial revolution.13
But native Dutch were left out of political power as well. They were seen as unable to
properly govern on their own by the British in the country. As John Ridpath wrote at the time,
“Hereupon Great Britain, seeing the inability of the Dutch to keep their grip on South
Africa...sent a fleet to the cape and took possession of the country in the name of the Prince of

11

The Dutch were seen as ‘vulgar’ and the African states as ‘wretched;’ “British settlers and travellers, of course
believed themselves to be far better than their darker-skinned neighbours--including Dutch-speaking colonists--and,
despite the inter-white conflict of the early years of British settlement, all were confident that their culture was
incomparably superior to that of the other peoples of the region, Clifton Crais, White Supremacy and Black
Resistance in Pre-Industrial South Africa: The Making of the Colonial Order in the Eastern Cape, 1770-1865.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). p. 128

12

George Bennett. “The Concept of Empire, Burke to Attlee, 1774-1947,” quoted in British Imperialism: Gold,
God, Glory ed. Robin Winks. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 1963) p. 75
13
William Worger and Rita Burms. South Africa : A Country Study (Washington DC: Federal Research Division,
Library of Congress. 1996). p. 1
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Orange.” Believing the Dutch to be unable to govern themselves properly, the British summarily
attempted to establish their authority over them. In this instance, we see the interplay of identity
politics and the removal of a competing ethnic group from political power, fueling tensions
between them.
Economic exclusionary practices leveraged by the British against other ethnic groups
were common practice as well. The abolition of slavery came from the notion that slavery was
not particularly beneficial to the British enterprise, and the decision to impose abolition in South
Africa came as a result of the British ethnic group mandating this political development in its
territories and forcing those living in them, including the Dutch, to conform to these standards.14
Farming was an integral part of the Dutch identity in South Africa; they called themselves the
Boers, meaning farmers. Thus, the removal of the principal institution permitting them to farm-slave labor--was seen as an attack on their identity as a whole. As John Ridpath wrote at the
time:
Slavery was not particularly advantageous to the British merchants and adventurers,
governors and soldiers of the countires of the Cape, but it was the favorite institution of
the Boers. The abolition fell upon them and disrupted their system. The Hottentots and
Negroes whom the Boers had held in bondage escaped from their control. As a matter of
fact, this was the first great measure which opened a fissure in the social and civil
purposes of the Boers on the one side and the British on the other.15
From this example, we can see how ethnic tension stemmed from the imposition of one identity
upon another: the British way would be the only way accepted, and the other ethnic groups
14

John Clark Ridpath and Edward Sylvester Ellis. The Story of South Africa: An Account of the Historical
Transformation of the Dark Continent by the European Powers and the Culminating Contest Between Great Britain
and the South African Republic in the Transvaal War. (Chicago: C.W. Stanton Co., 1899). p. 62
15
Ibid. p. 62-63
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would need to conform to British ideals or be rejected. In many ways, this was the impetus of the
series of treks the Dutch Boers would embark upon, hoping that an exodus from British-held
territory would help them escape domination. But the abolition of slavery was only targeted
against an institution perceived as barbaric, not in terms of an improved evaluation of the
enslaved peoples themselves. Rather, a common perception of the landscape and shared social
and economic goals among the Britons required the creation and maintenance of a dispossessed
and dependent class.16 The creation of this class was the result of identity and ethnic
considerations.17 Tensions would continue over the rights to gold and other precious metals in
South Africa. These findings would dramatically alter the economic and political structure, as
Clark and Worger wrote. They stated ““…the growing industry created ever-greater divisions
between British and Boer, white and black, rich and poor. The British, seeking to secure as much
of these resources as possible, conquered African states and established laws and economic
policies that restricted the ability for Africans and Boers to reap the profits.”18
Driving these political and economic developments were a series of exclusionary national
ideologies; identity development not only fostered the superiority of one’s own ethnic group, but
ipso facto, the lesser worth of others associated with a different identity. These stemmed from
the notion that other ethnic groups were unable to manage affairs to the same degree; as John
Hobson wrote:
The “occupation” of these new territories was comprised in the presence of a small
minority of white men, officials, traders, and industrial organisers, exercising political an

16

Clifton Crais, White Supremacy and Black Resistance, p. 129
The development of agrarian capitalism and the struggle over land and labor is what initiated this perception,
which centered on a series of dichotomies that fueled condemnation: “white” and “black,” “civilization” and
“barbarism,” etc.—Ibid.
18
Nancy L. Clark and William H. Worger, South Africa: The Rise and Fall of Apartheid, second ed. (Harlow,
United Kingdom: Longman. 2011) p. 14
17
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economic sway over great hordes of population regarded as inferior an as incapable of
exercising any considerable rights of self-government, in politics or industry.19
Because of the nature of their ethnic backgrounds, many Africans were subsequently
excluded from advancement or a role in governing themselves under British rule. Exclusionary
national ideologies strengthened against the ethnic Dutch following the conclusion of the Boer
Wars. The British victory in the war brought new changes to the continent, but the themes of
British superiority remained, and attempts to impose them were ramped up. The Boer republics
were incorporated into the British Empire, and the appointment of Alfred Milner as governor of
the newly acquired territories brought new attempts to Anglicize the territories. Milner sought to
encourage further immigration of British citizens and believed that it was crucial to have a
British majority among white male voters.20 Not only did he hope to secure a majority of British
in the gold industry, but he also hoped to secure the local legislatures in favor of British interests
through the power of numbers. In a strong example of the attempts of British imperialism to
force the conformity of the Other. There were attempts at both denationalization and
Anglicization in regard to Dutch-speakers. The use of Dutch was prevented in public schools
and in courts of law, in the hope that they would be incorporated into a unified white and British
identity rather than retain a separate identity.21
ii. Afrikaner Cultural Identity Establishment
In many ways, the development of Dutch Afrikaner identity stemmed from a result of and
in response to British encroachment, and years of problematic group histories combined with an
identity that infused notions of superiority within that identity. The Afrikaner version of history

19

John Hobson. Imperialism. (London: G. Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1938). p. 27
Clark and Worger, South Africa, p. 17
21
“Building Apartheid’s Pillars,” The Christian Science Monitor, 11 June 1986
20
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that emerged during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries offered distinct views, tinged with
cultural mythmaking and symbolic politics. These views “blossomed…among the Dutchspeaking settlers who perceived themselves as victims of British imperialism.”22 As a result of
interaction with the British, we see a distinct shift in identity away from the traditional rural
farming identity—the boers—to a new, more ethnocentric ideology.
Dutch attempts to establish their own identities and own context of social, political, and
economic development in South Africa ran up against the conformity demanded of the British to
their views and their inability to escape the encroaching British even through desperate attempts
like the Great Trek sparked resentment and hostility.23 Through these experiences, we see the
exploitation of these events in the context of cultural mythmaking and symbolic politics, two key
features of the development of Afrikaner identity and ethnocentrism.
Two primary factors were central to the rise of Afrikaner prominence, and the decline of
British influence following the establishment of the Union of South Africa: the establishment of
their own views of superiority and the reclamation of an identity in the post-South African War
era. In several ways, the Afrikaner self-conception mirrored the notions of superiority found in
British imperialism, and the incompatibility of these world views was a primary contributor in
the continuation of ethnic tensions between these groups and later, violence between whites and
blacks after the Afrikaners attained place and power. A “unique” interpretation of the Bible
through the Dutch Reformed Church was the primary foundation of these cultural values.
Donald Akenson writes that most of the Afrikaners believed that South Africa had been put on

22

Clark and Worger, South Africa, p.6.
“The Dutch farmers evidently supposed that this exodus and the establishment of a Republic in Natal would
forever rid them of the domination of the British. But it was not to be so...”—Ridpath and Ellis, Story of South
Africa, p. 63
23
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Earth by God in order to preserve a “line of divinely ordered historical development...that ran
from the creation to the end of history.”24
Combined with the notion held by most Afrikaners that their culture was one of the “pure
bastions of western civilization,”25 South Africa was supposed to be the safeguard of white
civilization, a sentinel protecting three centuries of European development on the African
continent. Thus, these Afrikaners, separating themselves from the remainder of the population,
created economic institutions and political institutions inaccessible to outsiders. Through
socializing institutions such as separate schools, Afrikaner cultural values were reinforced and
passed on throughout the generations. In conjunction with this idea of superiority was the
perception of outside threats to the culture, exacerbated by the British victory in the Boer War
and the great masses of Blacks and Coloureds who also lived in the country. The fear of these
forces only served to push the Afrikaners further into a mentality of isolation and protectionism.
Realization of these goals would prove more difficult. Segregationist policy implemented under
British rule in the Union of South Africa did not benefit all whites equally. As Leonard
Thompson wrote, “Although there were wealthy Afrikaners and poor British settlers, the ethnic
division in the white population corresponded with occupational and class differences. Then, at
the turn of the twentieth century the British government conquered the republics which the
Afrikaners created in the interior and made a serious effort to denationalize the Afrikaners.”

26

After the war and the establishment of the Union, Afrikaners who had lost their land and
economic stability in the war moved to the cities where the English had already dominated
mining, banking, and commerce, and black Africans filled the unskilled labor positions. As they
24

Donald Akenson, “The High Noon of Apartheid, 1948-1969,” in God’s Peoples: Covenant and Land in South
Africa, Israel and Ulster. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. 1992) p. 205
25
Ibid.
26
Leonard Thompson. The Political Mythology of Apartheid. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985). p. 26
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continued to be shut out because of the pro-English sentiments of business and bureaucracy, the
Afrikaners created a series of organizations like the Broderbund sought to mobilize members of
their ethnic group and establish their own, separate institutions in order to secure social, political,
and economic mobility and prominence away from the context of British society. 27
The establishment of Apartheid and the subsequent ethnic conflict that stemmed as a
result of the apex of Afrikaner prominence was a creeping process partially founded in Afrikaner
desires for exclusivity and preeminence, not unlike those found in British identity creation and
cultural mythmaking. The National Party stressed the proliferation of Afrikaans as a language,
and several exclusive financial institutions were formed. Social organizations like The
Broderbund were established to preserve Afrikaner culture. The promotion of cultural values
based in ethnocentrism came to a head with the celebration of the centenary of the Great Trek;
nationalist sentiment reached its apex at the celebration. During that time, at a gathering in
Pretoria, there is the development of a strong movement that advocated nationalist sentiments
and sought to appeal to all Afrikaners whatever their background. The sentiments of this
gathering continued through the formation of the Ossewabrandagwag, an organization that
sought to institute the rejection of participation in World War II, national unity, and develop an
Afrikaner-controlled republic.28
Thus, a series of social and economic institutions that stemmed directly from the creation
of this identity and codified many of the values of Afrikaner preeminence laid the foundation and
the will for a more organized political movement to reshape society to fit with these values. The
return of Liberals to power in Westminster and the rise of a new sense of Afrikanerdom
27

Martin Schönteich and Henry Boshoff, "'Volk' Faith and Fatherland. The Security Threat Posed by the White
Right", in Monograph. (Institute of Security Studies No. 81. 2003) pp.13-14
28
Christoph Marx. “The Ossewabrandwag As a Mass Movement, 1939-1941” in Journal of Southern African
Studies , Vol. 20, No. 2 (Jun., 1994), pp. 195-197
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combined at the beginning of the twentieth century to allow the Dutch their rise to power. With
the granting of self-government in the Orange River Colony and the Transvaal, the creation of
the Union of South Africa came into being primarily because of the shift in British mentality
from securing British dominance to the maintenance of white supremacy overall in the face of a
growing threat from non-whites demanding political power, social mobility, and greater
economic opportunity. However, while the British and the Dutch agreed that the reduction of
white power in general was undesirable and that cooperative steps should be taken to prevent it,
this did not mean that tensions between the two European ethnic groups were greatly improved.
The Afrikaners were the inheritors of the social, political, and economic structures that were the
legacy of British dominance.29 To preserve the preeminence of white power, while at the same
time seeking to prevent a loss of identity as was seen with the end of the Boer war, they sought
to entrench themselves at the top while preserving enough rights and privileges for other whites
to maintain support. Once the Dutch Afrikaners secured power at the end of the 1940s, they
embarked on a “purification” scheme--one couched in the assertion of superiority of Afrikaner
ethnic symbols and the dismantling of the other. We see the expression of ethnic identity and the
response to violence and tensions between the British and the Dutch through the replacement of
British sovereigns on postage stamps and money, the renaming of major honors, and the creation
of new holidays.30 Even the national anthem was replaced with an Afrikaner one: Die Stem.
Thus, there are similarities between Afrikaner policy toward other ethnic enclaves and that seen
among the British, particularly after the Afrikaners take power--the preeminence of the ethnic
group and the removal of those outside from power, sparking tensions and ethnic violence

29

John Cell. The Highest Stage of White Supremacy: The Origins of Segregation in South Africa and the American
South. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). p. 51

30

Thompson, The Political Mythology of Apartheid, p. 40
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between the included and excluded peoples. The ethnic violence between the Boers and the
British during the Boer Wars would not reemerge, but ethnic violence would reoccur in South
Africa between the disenfranchised Blacks and Coloureds and the whites in power. As such, we
can see the legacy of tension between identities, and how the Afrikaners sought to displace
British identity and symbolism for their own once they attained power, a reflection of the
tensions and violence between these two groups through their development.31
iii. Black Cultural Identity Development
The notions of a black identity, separate from that imposed upon this ethnic group by the
white enclaves and defined in particular by its members, emerged under apartheid. This identity
codified to better address problematic group histories and misconceptions perpetrated by
centuries of subjugation and cultural mythmaking. Before this period, ethnic identity was
fragmented into tribal enclaves, which allowed the British and Dutch to more easily divide the
population.32 Both the Dutch and British engaged in patterns of cultural discrimination against
the Africans. Leonard Thompson wrote that “Nearly all white South Africans, English-speakers
as well as Afrikaners, assumed that any sensible, civilized person knew that Africans were a
culturally inferior race and should be treated accordingly--an assumption that corresponded with
the global distribution of power and wealth and was still endorsed by reputable Western
scientists.”33 While there still remained tensions between the Dutch and the British, they were
occasionally able to set aside their differences and combine their forces against the much larger
African ethnic groups, engaging in inter-group and elite politics on temporary bases and finding
common ground in their white, European ancestry in order to stave off the black ethnic

31

Clark and Worger, South Africa, p. 32
Ike Rosamarin and Dee Rissik. South Africa. 2nd ed. (New York: Benchmark Books, 2003). p 59.
33
Thompson, The Political Mythology of Apartheid, p. 41
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conclaves. Despite their role in the fighting, Africans who expected that the end of the Boer wars
would be followed by significant improvements in their economic and political situation went
unrealized by either the peace treaty or Milner; that the exclusion came as a result of fear of a
“native uprising” if improvements in the status of nonwhites occurred speaks to the continued
view of non-Europeans as that of the lesser.34 As William Minter writes,
In the three decades from the foundation of the Union of South Africa to World War II,
Britain increasingly shared that burden of political and economic leadership with
the emergent ruling class of South Africa. Different factions contended for position, as
lines were drawn between the spheres of influence of the South African state and the
colonial powers, between London-based and South African-based capital, between
the competing white "races" of Boer and Briton. Behind that variety, however, lay
common ground. "Non-Europeans" were excluded from political rights as citizens,
assigned instead to the role of anonymous streams of labor power. The more liberal
and paternalistic versions of colonial ideology added at best a few qualifying clauses to
this general premise.35
Patterns of discrimination emerged in which laws previously established by the British were
taken to the extreme as Apartheid began to codify under the Dutch Afrikaners. Thus, black
identity emerged as a result of the continued systematic exclusion from political, social, and
economic development as a result of perceptions of superiority on the part of the whites, and the
exclusion and denigration of nonconformists. Members of the black and coloured ethnic groups
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began to adopt more cohesive notions of ethnic identity to act as a counterweight against the
smaller, but more powerful, white groups.
The formation of a distinct, self-defined identity among Africans can be traced to the
emergence of the Black Consciousness movement. Unlike the creation of identities and cultural
myths rooted in superiority as seen with the British and Afrikaners, the creation of Black identity
in South Africa was both reactionary and intentionally contrarian, intended to reframe historical
events and conceptions of blackness in a different framework than that imposed upon this ethnic
group by the more powerful white enclaves.36 As Leonard Thompson writes, two major
circumstances created a generational shift in the demeanor toward whites from deference to
defiance. The first came in 1960, with the massacre in Sharpeville and the subsequent banning of
the African National Congress and the Pan-Africanist conflict,“with the result that their leaders
came to the conclusion that they should abandon their reliance on nonviolent methods; armed
struggle, the concluded was the only way to liberate their people from a regime that lived by
violence.37 The second came as the result of an explosion in violence when African
schoolchildren, who were protesting the compulsory use of Afrikaans in school, were fired upon
by the police in Soweto, leading to hundreds of arrests, tortures, and killings.38
The aim of this ethnic group, therefore, was to remove what they viewed as suppression
under white rule, and both attack and distance themselves from what they viewed as white
values. This ultimately resulted in a strengthened mutual identity intended to challenge the ethnic
enclaves of the Dutch and British for political, social, and economic superiority in South Africa
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as resistance to the imposition of Apartheid strengthened.39 In doing so, we see the reframing of
historical events in a manner that stressed the grievances of the past

40

and the development of

symbolic politics that exploit that past.41 Thus, ethnic conflict in South Africa continued to be
inflamed as this new identity was forged and clashed with the other enclaves for primacy.
Ethnic conflict between whites and non-whites emerged during this period because the
nature of political, social, and economic order had changed. World War II and its conclusion had
brought about significant changes: greater urbanization, economic opportunity through
industrialization, and a new global concern with the struggle of oppressed peoples allowed the
non-whites to organize in ways previously unattainable. While this caused the Afrikaner
government to feel it needed to crack down hard to preserve its newfound political dominance,
the seeds of change had been planted. The desire on the part of non-whites to attain improved
political, economic, and social standing were fueled by the knowledge that these were things to
which they were entitled as a part of “human rights,” which strengthened their resolve in a
profound way that would not have been possible in the centuries of repression and segregation
that had existed before.42 It was the failure of the Afrikaner government to grant these rights and
the extremities of Apartheid laws that sparked the ethnic conflict that would characterize the
Apartheid period. However, it must not be forgotten that the tools and legacy for these laws were
39
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already in place, and the mentalities that justified them, came as a result of the social, political,
and economic conditions that had come to define British rule in South Africa.
What can we take away, therefore, from this historical overview of South Africa before
the eruption of ethnic tension during Apartheid? The exclusion from power, social standing, and
economic opportunities on the basis of non-Britishness by the encroaching empire lead to the
development of grievances and cultural myth-making among all ethnic groups, sparked desires
for change, and we see the creeping rise of increased violence to effect change or retain power.
Ethnic conflict, therefore, stemmed from the desire of competing ethnic groups to wrest authority
and control from the dominant power in charge and reformat society to be more beneficial to
their specific ethnic group. When these goals were countered, tensions became bloodshed. When
the Afrikaners took power after the British, and began to implement an even more extreme
version of exclusion, tensions between all groups came to a head, and the ethnic violence
between whites and blacks that had been brewing for centuries began to boil over. All of these
factors, however, were the result of the creation of defined ethnic identities and the infusion of
ethnocentrism within them.
C. The Influence of Ethnocentric Identities and Development of Ethnic Tension in Northern
Ireland
i. British Ethnocentrism in Ireland
Tension between the British and the Irish had its origins in the first arrivals of
Englishmen in the sixteenth century, where the seizure of large tracts of land and concentrated
economic and political resources in the hands of this ethnic enclave, and political representation
and social mobility became restricted. When the English began serious colonization in 1550,
their increased expansion sparked tensions as the Irish became further displaced. Until 1603,
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the British and the Irish in Northern Ireland were largely separated, with the English
concentrated in the south and a thriving Celtic culture in the Ulster region. While there was a
concerted effort and the partial anglicizing of the rest of the Irish, Ulster remained a stronghold
under Celtic princes with a Celtic society.43 In 1603, however, the last Celtic Prince, Hugh
O’Neill surrendered to Lord Mountjoy, the English Lord Deputy of Ireland. As Donald Akenson
writes, “This event marked a watershed in Irish history: the last of the independent Irish princes
was subdued...England could now settle matters in Ireland permanently, or so it seemed.”44 As a
result, there is a concerted displacement of Irish identity on the island. As Donald Akenson
writes, “Most of the Irish chiefs were pardoned and allowed to keep their lands, but they, like
Tyrone and Tyrconnell, were granted the land not as Irish chiefs but under new rules that
converted them into English style landlords; the superseding of the Irish system of land tenure by
the English system rapidly undercut the Celtic social system.”45 This action reflects the
continuing theme of the issue of ethnic superiority in the ruling power and the attempts to
convert or subdue the Other.
An acceleration of the displacement of identity and the tension between the Irish and the
English over the issue of identity would be seen with the departure of over a hundred Irish chiefs
seeking to escape the decline of their influence and the harassment of the English government,
which left Ulster without native Irish leadership and open to further English manipulation. To fill
this power vacuum, the British engaged in the plantation of Ulster, bringing in British authorities
and concentrating social, economic, and political power in the hands of the British. As for the
43

Donald Akenson, “The Covenantal Culture of the Ulster-Scots,” in God’s Peoples: Covenant and Land in South
Africa, Israel and Ulster. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. 1992) p. 103

44

Ibid.

45

Ibid., p. 105

Identity Crisis

24

Irish natives, only a small amount of land was granted to them, in exchange for certain loyalty
and the adoption of English social and agricultural customs. As a result of these changes, the
native Irish went from owning almost all of the land and living according to their own customs
and traditions before 1603 to the lowest tenants, holding the least amount of land and the poorest
tracts.46 Their political leaders had left, and the majority social systems fell, leaving only their
Catholic traditions to hold on to. Thus, for the Irish, their sense of identity was either displaced
or overwritten by the incoming British, and this loss of identity was perpetuated as the result of
the British ethnic enclaves utilizing the political, economic, and social tools available to them to
secure their own place in power. Violence thus erupted from the tensions between these ethic
groups as dispossessed Catholics protested against their new status, sparking several civil wars
between the Irish and the British. These early conflicts, particularly the victory of the British in
the Battle of the Boyne, would come to be an integral part of cultural mythmaking and symbolic
politics as ethnic conflict would continue through the twentieth century. After this victory,
British regimes would further exclude the Irish from what little political power they retained and
rescind a series of other rights, isolating them from the spoils enjoyed by the British ethnic
enclave.47
Thus, from the beginnings of British encroachment in Ireland we can see how the issue of
identity fueled the use of political, social, and economic tools to exclude the other or force
conformity. Through 1691, the Irish had been ruled a minority group of Protestant English, who
passed a series of laws which discriminated against the Irish Catholic population and nonAnglican protestants and which lasted up through the beginnings of the nineteenth century.
These Penal Laws were targeted against the Other, to force the Irish, who had clung to religion
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as the last vestige of their culture, and other non-Anglicans to accept British ethnic norms,
discriminating against those who would threaten the primacy of Britishness.48 These penal laws
excluded non-Anglicans from economic, political, educational and social opportunities, almost a
precursor to the way Black and Coloured Africans were excluded in South Africa. As Tilly
writes, “In Ulster, a triangular relationship emerged: Anglican landlords dominated politics and
economic life; leaseholders, skilled workers, and professionals came mainly from the Protestant
population; and Catholics concentrated disproportionately in landless labor.”49 Thus, the notions
of superiority of British identity created discriminatory political institutions as Ireland entered
the eighteenth century, which were exacerbated further as the British began to outnumber the
Irish in Ulster.
Through the nineteenth century, past instances of British conquest and displacement of
the Irish were justified through intellectual assertions of a superior culture. As Brian Jenkins
writes,
More common was the disdainful and casual dismissal of Ireland’s Catholics as “an
inferior and degraded caste.” One Catholic Irishman who had embraced Britishness
protested that “the spirit of eminence and masterdom” was “so fixedly settled” in the
English that they could never bring themselves to regard the Irish as their equals.50
In the previous centuries of British rule in Ireland we see the precursors of this
development through evidence of attempts to maintain economic superiority, political power,
and social prominence for adherents to British institutions, primarily through religious
discrimination. As the British began to develop a stronger national identity, so too were the
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concentrations of these elements into the hands of the British in Ireland strengthened. As British
identity was refined through intellectual developments, this ethnic enclave sought to further
distinguish themselves from the Irish, and thus both justify and expand British control over Irish
social, political, and economic institutions. This is similar to the justifications used in South
Africa to remove the opportunities of advancement from the Boers and non-whites. As Paul Rich
wrote,
The Irish were often a particular object of professional interest with the measurement and
recording of different racial types, particularly those of ‘Saxon’ and ‘Celt.’ This has led
some scholars…to argue that the Victorian conception of Irish racial make-up reflected
an underlying anthropological racism that was similar in content to colonial racism
toward black and brown peoples.51
Thus we see the further relegation of the Irish to lower social castes on the basis of
pseudoscientific and perceived immutable differences between them and the British. But this
view of the Other as lesser that was a defining characteristic of British imperialism also had
political ramifications as well. Rich wrote:
Curtis has also seen the obsession with the racial difference of the Celtic Irish explaining
the continued resistance to demands for Home Rule in the decades before 1914. The
racial stereotyping of the Irish was in effect a basic pillar of the Unionist claim that the
Celtic Irish were essentially unfit for self-government and required continued direct rule
from the Anglo Saxon government in London. 52
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Exacerbating the notion of separate identities and fueling conflict between them was the
creation of political-religious organizations. The Orange Order for British and Ribbonmen for
the Irish have helped contribute to division through the use of symbolic imagery and political
rhetoric that emphasizes ethnic differences, different cultural conceptions of historical events,
and the roles their ethnic enclaves played in those events. These organizations often stage public
challenges and shows of strength, which become violent as they stir the opposing group to
action,53 creating and proliferating problematic group histories. As Niall O’Dowd wrote,
The 12th may well have been a celebration of a long ago battle at the Boyne in 1690, but
it came to symbolize for generations of Catholics the "croppie lie down" mentality on the
Orange side. The thunderous beat of the huge drums was just a small way of instilling
fear into the Nationalist communities, while the insistence on marching wherever they
liked through Nationalist neighborhoods was also a statement of supremacy and contempt
for the feelings of the other community.
In terms of economic concerns, there is evidence of the proliferation of British economic
interests over that of Ireland to such a degree that it has even been pointed to as a contributing
factor in the development of the Irish Potato Famine. James Froude wrote at the time: "England
governed Ireland for what she deemed her own interest, making her calculations on the gross
balance of her trade ledgers, and leaving moral obligations aside, as if right and wrong had been
blotted out of the statute book of the Universe.”54
Thus, we see how the developments in British self-conception came into play during the
nineteenth century, and how the exclusion of the non-British from equal access created social,
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political and economic tensions, much as they did in South Africa. As it did during the civil
wars. ethnic violence would emerge as the Irish began to resist the continued state of
mistreatment directed against them, and counter the notions of British identity as the highest
level of human condition.

ii. Irish Consciousness and the Development of Ethnic Tensions
The creation of an Irish identity in response to the creation of a British identity emerged
in a manner similar to the creation of a Black identity in South Africa: within the context of
redefining ethnic ties on the basis of in-group qualifications, rather than those imposed by British
superiority and distinctions. Irish nationalism began to codify during the 19th century, seeking to
foster a commitment to Irish culture as distinct from the British. The Celtic Revival movement,
stemming from the development of the Society of the United Irishmen and the Young Irelanders,
among other groups were based on the “the indivisibility of Gaelic cultural integrity, territorial
sovereignty, and the interlinking of Gaelic identity with profession of the Roman Catholic
faith."55 But this was not simply a movement that sought simply a revival; it was couched in
opposition to British treatment of Irish Culture. Writing in 1892, Charles Duffy stated:
A group of young men, among the most generous and disinterested in our annals, were
busy digging up the buried relics of our history, to enlighten the present by a knowledge
of the past, setting up on their pedestals anew the overthrown statues of Irish worthies,
assailing wrongs which under long impunity had become unquestioned and even
venerable, and warming as with strong wine the heart of the people, by songs of valour
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and hope; and happily not standing isolated in their pious work, but encouraged and
sustained by just such an army of students and sympathizers as I see here to-day.56
From this attempt to redefine Irish identity, we see the same notions of ethnocentrism and
superiority of the in-group in relation to the Other emerge. As Alan O’Day observes, this notion
was exemplified through the development of symbolism; “Several ‘superior’ national symbols,
such as the harp, the colour green, St Patrick’s Day, and the shamrock, retained their significance
in the Free State…”57 Thus, the notions of superior identity became evident through the
replacement of the symbols of British rule with ones this ethnic group perceived as more fitting.
Irish resistance to British rule and resentment of unequal treatment had been a common theme,
but it took the alterations of the existing global paradigm for the suppressed people to begin to
mount a counteroffense. Much as World War II provided a series of global political, social, and
economic changes that allowed the non-whites to organize and mobilize against discriminatory
laws that ensured white supremacy and the exclusion of the Other, near the beginning of the
nineteenth century, the success of the American Revolution and the French Revolution gave
heart to the Irish, and they launched a rebellion in 1798 against English rule. While the rebellion
was not successful, it started a movement against the current status of social, political, and
economic exclusion that would continue, and added new narratives to the well of cultural
mythmaking and symbolic politics that the Irish would recount in their justification of further
resistance and bloodshed against a people whom they viewed as having repressed them for
centuries.
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Ironically, it was the granting of greater rights and freedoms to the Irish that exacerbated, rather
than ameliorated, ethnic tensions between the British and the Irish. As Tilly writes,
As the franchise expanded and party politics began to flourish, election campaigns
became new sites of Protestant-Catholic rivalry and also new occasions for collective violence.
Mass mobilization of anti-British movements across Ireland as a whole during the later
nineteenth century drew in many Ulster Catholics, thus spurring Unionists (as the pro-British
Protestant forces began to call themselves) to self-defense. On both sides, arming, drilling, and
threatening accelerated into World War I, when Irish nationalists took up arms and declared a
republic--only to suffer another round of deep depression.58
The British, however, were not able to provide the means for social, economic, and
political advancement quickly enough to satisfice the demands of the Irish, nor to ameliorate
centuries of ethnic tension stemming from discrimination against the Irish. Thus, the granting of
increased rights resulted in violent attempts to fully break the power of the government and
replace it with self-rule, as was seen in South Africa.
The failure of the Home Rule Act to appease either Unionists or Nationalists sparked
several attempts by the Irish to overthrow the British government and subsequent resistance by
the British against these attempts. While most of Ireland gained independence from Britain, the
areas with the greatest concentration of British, the Six Counties of Ulster, remained under
control of the Crown. Attempts by the Irish to incorporate these territories into a United Ireland
and resistance by British nationalists kept the continuation of ethnic conflict until the signing of
the Belfast agreement.
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In Ulster, the Catholics began to unify in protest against British exclusionary practices
leveled against them. Civil rights groups like the Campaign for Social Justice and the Northern
Ireland Civil Rights Association emerged in hopes to counteract the Irish position as a lesser
ethnic group under the law. 59

II. The Application of Ethnic Violence Solution Theory to South Africa and Northern Ireland
We have established that it was tension stemming from competing identities that were the
true underlying causes of ethnic conflict in South Africa and Northern Ireland. These identities
still remain today, even though violence has subsided. How, then can we explain the continued
presence of ethnic identities in conjunction with the reduced presence of violence in these states?
The application of theoretical factors can help explain how this is possible, and help highlight the
differences in approaches to lessening violence taken by South Africa and Northern Ireland.
In Northern Ireland, there is a prevailing view among scholars that the bulk of the violence is for
the most part over; the security dilemma has been resolved, the paramilitary groups have lain
down their arms, and rational negotiation has won the day. As Alan Aughey writes, “There has
been a tentative consensus amongst students of Northern Ireland politics that the Belfast
Agreement of 10 April 1998 may be taken to mark the end of a particular era...popularly known
as ‘the Troubles’ or ‘the recent Troubles’ in order to distinguish them from the political violence
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which attended the partition of Ireland in the early 1920s.” 60 This consensus is exemplified by
J.C. Beckett, who writes:
Though the settlement left a legacy of bitterness, issuing occasionally in local and
sporadic disturbances, it inaugurated for Ireland a longer period of general tranquility
than she had known since the first half of the eighteenth century.61
Scholars have even chosen to characterize the state of Northern Ireland following the
Good Friday Agreement as having shifted substantially enough to warrant reclassification; the
ethnic conflict has ended not because of a formal pronouncement of such, but because of a shift
from a violent state of affairs to political conflict between parties. Analysis of the history of the
conflict given by Jesse and Williams demonstrates this conclusion. They write that The Good
Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland signaled a new approach to solving the intractable
conflict,”62 and go on to characterize the conflict in terms of political parties and the stalemates
of assemblies, rather than as an ethnic issue; they highlight the importance of a “...changed
political landscape in Northern Ireland.”

63

Additional writings pointing to the cease-fire

agreement component and its subsequent follow-through by the IRA as indicative of the end of
this conflict. According to A.A. Barros D’Sa “Perhaps the quarter century of futile terrorism and
internecine strife in Northern Ireland is coming to an end...The cease fire has generated a mixture
of relief, scepticism and hope.” 64
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In Northern Ireland, ethnic violence has subsided as a result of the use of deterrence.65
There is an unstable peace in the region as a result of the decision of both sides to come to a
tentative settlement through the decommissioning of weapons and normalization of security as
outlined in the Good Friday Agreement.66 The threat of ongoing terrorism and a fear of further
violence forced a political accommodation which addressed some of the continuing political
tensions over the status of Northern Ireland. The combination of a strong outside power
administering the state in conjunction with this deterrence has effectively reduced violence from
the level of bombings and shootings to the occasional riot.
The conditions of tentative peace in South Africa, however, have emerged from different
circumstances. In Northern Ireland, the violence was concluded through political development;
ethnic identities have largely remained intact, which results in lingering tensions between ethnic
groups. In South Africa, violence has been addressed less through political means but through
social reformation. Much in the way elites mobilized identity instrumentally during the
Apartheid years, there has also been a movement in the post-Apartheid years to redefine identity
and one’s place in South African society.67 Through attempts the resolution of grievances and a
concerted effort in the state to reorganize around a single South African identity, violence in
South Africa has subsided through attempts to reform ethnic identity conceptions, particularly
65

“Mutual deterrence does not guarantee that there will be no further violence, but it reduces the probability of
outbreaks, as well as the likely aims and intensity of those that do occur.”--Chaim Kaufman. “Possible and
Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Conflict.” In M. Brown (Ed.), Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict. (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: MIT Press. 1997) p. 458
66
Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations, 10 April 1998
67
“Two phenomena, both almost uniformly overlooked in the current climate of utter condemnation, bolster such a
perspective. The first is a largely impressionistic observation for which there is scant statistical, but much anecdotal,
support: A surprising amount of personal goodwill and understanding exists among the races in South Africa, and it
should survive anything short of the most cataclysmic political upheaval.[1] There is a recognition, by all save the
more extreme elements, of the necessity for racial accommodation. The whites understand that black aspirations will
have to be met in some form; blacks in turn understand that the whites are in South Africa to stay and that they will
make an essential contribution to any post-transitional society.”--Peter Spiro, “Better Now Than Never:
Economic and Social Reforms In South Africa’ in Cato Policy Analysis No. 81(Washington D.C.: Cato Institute.
1987).

Identity Crisis

34

through education and the notion of shared values.68 Much as ethnic identities in South Africa
emulated British superiority complexes, they could also emulate the British retreat from
superiority and empire as was seen after the conclusion of the Second World War.
Thus, even though identity formation and the ethnocentrism that became a defining feature of
those identities was the underlying cause in ethnic conflict in South Africa and Northern Ireland,
the two states have approached the issue with different solutions; in the former, concerted efforts
at reshaping identity have emerged, and in the latter, efforts to separate and promote tolerance of
ethnic identities, rather than reshape them into something new, have been the focus.
As such, we see the implementation of two competing theories regarding the resolution of
ethnic conflict, both with success at curbing ethnic violence. In Northern Ireland, the state has
implemented the political solution offered by Chaim Kafuman. In “Possible and Impossible
Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,” Chaim Kaufman argues that the only viable solution to ethnic
conflict is when the opposing groups are demographically separated into defensible enclaves, or
with the presence of international forces or a conquering empire to keep the peace.69
In Northern Ireland the application of this notion has been attempted in official and unofficial
political capacities both before the Troubles and during. As a result of the Anglo-Irish Treaty to
end the Irish War of Independence, Northern Ireland was given the opportunity to opt out of
joining the new Irish Free State in the south as part of a dominion, or remaining a part of the
United Kingdom. With a Protestant majority, six of the nine counties of Ulster elected to remain
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part of the new United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Thus, part of Kaufman’s
theory was exercised; the country was split into Protestant and Catholic parts. The theory was
also applied within Northern Ireland itself. Public housing is overwhelmingly segregated,
especially in the capital of Belfast. As a result of the Troubles, and persistent ethnic tensions both
before and after this period, once-mixed areas have been replaced by overwhelmingly polarized
neighborhoods. This is the result of not only public housing developments, but an overwhelming
amount of self-segregation among the people themselves. In 2004, it was estimated that 92.5% of
public housing in Northern Ireland was divided along religious lines, with the figure rising to
98% in Belfast.70. In conjunction with this, the government has erected a series of “peace lines,”
high walls and gates across the roads designed to curtail violence by preventing travel at certain
points of tension and in an effort to keep interface zones--areas where Protestant and Catholic
neighborhoods intersect--more safe. Additionally, we see the political validity of the presence of
both ethnic identities, with the extension of equal rights for all citizens and even the option for
citizens to choose which passport they wish to acquire—an Irish or a British—in line with their
identities. Further, we see not only the continued presence of British rule to clamp down on
violence, but the combined opportunities for involvement with the Republic of Ireland, allowing
for peace enforcement through international presences as well as a powerful, conquering state.
In South Africa, however, there has been a different approach to curbing violence, one
outlined by Stuart Kaufman. Stuart Kaufman argues that both peace and reconciliation are
necessary for lasting stability and the amelioration of hostile emotions, and writes that “a
comprehensive strategy integrating the logic and practice of reconciliation initiatives with the
traditional tools of international mediation and conflict resolution,” is the “new hypothesis” to
70

“Self-imposed Apartheid.” The Guardian, 22 July 2007. Retrieved from
http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2004/apr/14/northernireland.societyhousing

Identity Crisis

36

resolving longstanding ethnic conflict issues.71 The components of this strategy involve mutual
recognition and acceptance, invested interests and goals in developing peaceful relations, as well
as fully normalized, cooperative political, economic and cultural relations. Recognition
initiatives as a part of this strategy can include reconciliation initiatives, verbal or symbolic
acknowledgement of past deeds, NGO-organized problem-solving workshops, cultural events,
media initiatives, and educational reform. Public truthtelling, partial justice, redefinition of social
identities, and a call for a new relationship between parties. The approach in South Africa has
been more focused on creating lasing peace through social transformation utilizing these aspects.
Public truthtelling and partial justice to ameliorate tensions between groups for past misdeeds
and facilitate forward progress have been seen in the development of the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission.72 Political leaders and ethnic elites emphasized the need for a new
relationship between ethnic enclaves in the aftermath of Apartheid.` Perhaps most crucially,
several symbolic steps have been taken to redefine South Africa as one united nation with many
parts, and the state and elites have undertaken a concerted effort to redefine social identities into
a greater, more cohesive conception, stepping away from the traditional ethnocentric notions of
superiority and toward greater inclusion.73 While the traditional ethnic identities still remain in
South Africa, there is still a concerted effort at altering self-conception that is not seen strongly
in Northern Ireland; promotions of a combined Ulster identity do not compare to the efforts seen
in South Africa to create a “rainbow nation.” Thus, while both Northern Ireland and South Africa

71

Stuart Kaufman. “Escaping the Symbolic Politics Trap: Reconciliation Initiatives and Conflict Resolution in
Ethnic Wars.” in Journal of Peace Research, 43(2) (2006): pp. 201-218.
72
Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Volume 1
73
“Identity formation as well as the myth of the 'rainbow nation' and its performative intention have served to
discursively create a national identity that has been top-down in its constitution and implementation.”—Nahala
Valiji, Creating the Nation: The Rise of Violent Xenophobia in the New South Africa (Unpublished Masters Thesis:
York University Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, 2003).

Identity Crisis

37

have seen a decline in the level of ethnic violence, the South African approach has been more
effective in helping to resolve ethnic tensions between on the whole. 74
III. The Remnants of Ethnic Identities—Lingering Problems and the Potential for Further
Violence
Ethnic violence has been consistently low in both South Africa and Northern Ireland.
However, the consistent presence of ethnic identities in these states still presents a problem.
Despite the best efforts of elites, racism and ethnic identities have not been completely
eliminated from South Africa, and they continue to hold a prominent place in Northern Ireland
society. Thus, there is the potential for ethnic violence to resurge. To prevent this, three primary
factors currently preventing progress must be targeted and suppressed before the potential for a
resurgence of violence can be further repressed: the trickle-down of hostile ideology, the element
of youthful mischief-making and the presence of spoilers.
The first initiative in creating a new paradigm should be the prevention of the assumption
of hateful ideology by the next generations. The perpetuation of cultural mythmaking must not
be allowed to poison the youth growing up in Northern Ireland; and South Africa; failure to do
so will only result in the perpetuation of the conflict. Public and personal initiatives can assist in
this regard. The importance of parents imparting values based not on hatred, but on cooperation,
tolerance, and acceptance, cannot be overstated. Holidays with charged cultural elements must
be retooled to be inclusive or eliminated. Illustrating the problem, in Northern Ireland with the
continuation of such “traditions” as the burning of large wooden pillars composed of shipping
crates and pallets and decked with flags, jerseys, scarves and other memorabilia representing the
Republic of Ireland by Protestants in “celebration” of the anniversary of the Battle of the Boyne,
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combined with such sectarian chanting as “Fuck the Pope and the IRA!” and inflammatory
paramilitary songs and parades, it’s no wonder that ethnic divisions are not only perpetuated by
the adults, but adopted by their children. In South Africa, the use of inflammatory songs by
politicians like Julius Malema75 and the symbolic exploitation of instances like the murder of the
far-right Eugene Terreblanche76 serve similar purposes. These practices must stop in order for
peace to go forward. In Northern Ireland, a fully-funded and comprehensive Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, modeled on that of South Africa, will allow for the realities of the
conflict to be better displayed in full public view, providing humanizing elements to the
consequences of perpetual antagonism, but this commission must be allowed to bring responsible
parties to trial for their actions or risk the perception of ineffectiveness. In South Africa, which
has already conducted a truth commission, active steps need to be taken to hold perpetrators of
atrocities on all sides responsible for their actions and brought to justice. Further, the nature of
murals in Northern Ireland and public symbols recalling the Apartheid years must be replaced.
These prominent displays are an important factor in the perpetuation of cultural mythmaking,
and should instead reflect a character of inclusion, togetherness, and the elements of harmony.
As well, workshops and informal discussions will help not only the youth to reject the
perpetuation of hatred and intolerance, but adults as well. Kaufman writes:
The aim of such workshops is to bring together people from opposing sides of a conflict,
so they can replace their mythical beliefs about the other side with better information and
replace their hostility and fear with enough understanding to make a compromise peace
look attractive and attainable. If successful, these experiences start to build trust among
participants across group lines. ‘Track II diplomacy’, in particular, involves problem
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solving workshops carried out by elites who have access to top leaders but are not part of
the official leadership. Such talks allow for an informal, and often more creative,
exploration of options than formal leaders are willing to risk.77
These elements thus empower those in society with a peace mentality to spread this ideology to
others. As well, some of these major elements, such as workshops and truth commissions, can be
conducted by third-parties, thus allowing them to go forward even in the event of opposition of
top leaders fearful of losing their base of power if the elements of conflict disappear.
Second, the exploitation of the conflict and perceived past grievances by troublemaking
youth as a flimsy excuse to cause violence, with some perception of justification or cultural
impunity must be counteracted. During my time in Belfast, I witnessed several riots and
uprisings coinciding with July 11-12, the anniversary of the Battle of the Boyne. In making
inquiries, a large consensus of those whom I spoke with on both the Protestant and Catholic sides
see the conflict as ancillary to these actions. Rioters with petrol bombs blowing up cars in the
streets are not doing so out of real protest against grave injustice, but because the appearance of
doing so allows them to behave disruptively without the fear of tangible consequences. In reality,
it is violence for the sake of violence. Similarly, in South Africa, violence continues to be
perpetrated against white farmers, and more than 3000 have been killed since 1994, and
numerous protests and riots, most notably in 2008, stemming from xenophobia and ethnic
tensions. In addition, as Terrence Corrigan writes,
Persistent crime resulted in many people turning to vigilantism. South Africa is no longer
threatened by violent instability, but insecurity arises from other types of violence: gang
activity, urban terrorism, vigilantism, and feuding in the taxi industry...It suggests a
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systematically

(unlike random crime) and can become a ‘way of life’ for both victims and perpetrators.78
Such elements are alluded to by John Mueller, where he argues that ethnic conflict is the
perpetrations of small, roving bands of thugs, asserts that ethnic motivations were ancillary for
these gangs, and that the primary motivations of the thugs stem solely from the opportunity to
perpetrate what he calls “Carnivals of often-drunk looting, destruction and violence,”79 with
relative impunity and with the blessings of authorities. These “ruffians,” as Mueller calls them,
see their exercises not as removing the stain of an enemy people, but as the chance to bully,
intimidate and indulge freely in the base whims of the id. However, unlike Mueller, who states in
his article that because of these localized expressions of violence, ethnic conflict does not exist, I
argue the opposite; by choosing to frame their actions in the context of ethnicity and injustice
perpetuated from one ethnic group to another, they contribute to the overall culture of ethnic
tensions, and thus help continue the framing of conflict in ethnic terms--hence the proper
application of the label “ethnic conflict.” In addressing this repeated and problematic issue, it
becomes necessary to redefine the perception of these thugs. They argue that they are fighting
against an ethnic injustice; it must therefore be counter-argued in the press and among
cooperative elements in society, both publicly and privately, that they are not. As well, the police
must take a harder stance on these youth. Instead of setting up stationary riot lines and blasting
the rioters with water cannons, there must be tangible and visible crackdowns on this kind of
behavior, more numerous arrests, as well as a greater intolerance and condemnation of this kind
of disruptive behavior in public statements. Only the reframing of these youth in the proper
context--that of people taking advantage and exploiting the true horrors of the past for their own
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pleasure--will allow for the necessary public shaming and condemnation, which combined with
increased police action will help curb this element.
Finally, the remnants of spoilers and their hostile feelings must be attended to. In
Northern Ireland, radical sectarian elements are still attempting to use violence in order to attain
victory for their side. On April 28, 2012, a 600-pound van containing a bomb with the potential
to kill everyone within a 50-meter radius was intercepted at the border between Northern Ireland
and the Republic of Ireland.80 In addition, a small car bomb was also detected and defused. Had
these bombs reached their intended target, it could have inflamed ethnic tensions once again.
Steven McCaffery further reports that “Dissident republicans opposed to the peace process are
being blamed for the failed attack.” 81 Returning again to the murder of Eugene Terreblanche in
South Africa, widespread fears of the resurgence of political violence as a result of the trial of his
attackers were present, and while these did not come to fruition, they underly the continuing
ethnic tension between groups.82 These action and others similar to it represent the still-present
elements of spoilers, those looking to derail the peace process for their own aims. Again, a
stronger police and judicial crackdown on these elements, combined with a public shaming, will
help mitigate these spoilers. Once these three factors have been implemented, the cultures of
Northern Ireland and South Africa should be significantly more conducive to a return to a sense
of cooperation, and be underway to a new future of peace and cooperation.
IV. Conclusion
Conflict over identity is what fueled ethnic conflict in South Africa and Northern Ireland, and the
fact that these identities persist means that there is still the potential for a resurgence of violence
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between these groups. Ethnic violence has subsided, but the lingering tensions and identity
politics continue to keep conflict alive. The answer to the amelioration of lingering ethnic
problems in Northern Ireland and South Africa cannot be appropriately summarized in a single
paper; in both cases centuries of mistrust and legitimate grievances on different sides weave a
complex web of issues that must be tackled. No theory will be able to be perfectly applied, nor
will a series of recommendations be able to be fully implemented with 100% success. The
theories addressed, the plans outlined, and the suggestions made for implementing them are a
series of hypotheses that represent only what is ideal, the optimum solution for a perfect world.
Encouraging a culture and its leaders to change so drastically and in the manner prescribed is a
tall order. But one thing is certain: the answer to the conflicts of Northern Ireland and South
Africa lies in the people of these states, Protestant and Catholic, white, black, and coloured, and
in the notion that the promises of peace will one day outweigh the cravings for vengeance and
victory. It is therefore hoped that the recommendations outlined here will provide the makings of
framework in which to do so, and serve as illuminating signposts on the path to an end to the
conflict.
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